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In 2011, the United States was only just beginning to emerge from what
some claimed to be the most significant economic crisis since the Great De-
pression.1  The devastation wrought by unregulated subprime mortgages un-
folded as a political, legal, financial and social tragedy.2  Millions of
homeowners had purchased homes for amounts they most certainly could
not afford, with terms and conditions written on documents they even more
certainly had never read.  Many of those most severely affected were, as one
might expect, racial minorities and underrepresented groups,3 but plenty of
* William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See Miguel Almunia et. al, From Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: Similari-
ties, Differences and Lessons 8, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15524,
2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15524 (“[w]hen viewed as a global phenomenon, the cur-
rent economic crisis was a Depression-sized event”).
2. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, xv (2013) (“This
was a fundamental disruption—a financial upheaval, if you will—that wreaked havoc in com-
munities and neighborhoods across this country.”)(hereinafter FINAL REPORT). According to
the FINAL REPORT, almost $11 trillion dollars in household debt vanished. See id.; see also
Simon Johnson, Three Unlearned Lessons From the Financial Crisis, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Sept. 26, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-09-26/three-un-
learned-lessons-from-the-financial-crisis (estimating that the U.S. lost at least 40% of 2007
gross domestic product).
3. See GREGORY D. SQUIRES, DEREK S. HYRA & ROBERT N. RENNER, SEGREGATION
AND THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS 3 (Apr. 16, 2009) (presented at 2009 Federal Reserve
System Community Affairs Research Conference, D.C.) http://www.kansascityfed.org/publi-
cat/events/community/2009carc/Hyra.pdf (reporting that approximately 53.7% of African
American and 46.6% of Latino mortgagors received subprime mortgages compared to 17.7%
of White mortgagors.); see also DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, WEN LI, CAROLINA REID &
ROBERTO G. QUERCIA, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOST GROUND, 2011: DISPARITIES IN
MORTGAGE LENDING AND FORECLOSURES 3 (Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.responsiblelending
.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Lost-Ground-2011.pdf; DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN,
WEN LI & KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING Foreclosures by Race and
Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis 1-2 (June 18, 2010), http://www.responsiblelending
.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf.  For analysis
of the historical and regulatory context for this disparity, see e.g., Aleatra P. Williams, Lending
Discrimination, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Perpetuation of Racial and Ethnic Disparities
in Homeownership in the U.S., 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 601 (2015).
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other members of society were also caught in the intricately woven fine print
of the “contracts” that compelled the crisis.4
These well-known points in recent history are connected to another: In
2011, Professor Margaret Jane (Peggy) Radin completed the manuscript for
her book Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule of
Law.5  It was published in 2013 when the cause, consequences and implica-
tions of the subprime mortgage crisis were still being debated.6 Certainly,
the consequences of the crisis are still unfolding today.7 Boilerplate com-
pels us to more fully appreciate and understand the structural antecedents of
the crises.  In it, Professor Radin offers an unreserved analysis of the institu-
tional, economic and welfare loss occasioned by boilerplate contracts now
4. See FINAL REPORT, at xviii-xx (2013)(providing a description of the business prac-
tices that led to the crisis and the failure of different regulatory bodies to catch and address
problems along the way).  There is, of course, also the way in which the fragmented ownership
of mortgages made it impossible for mortgagees to engage directly with their contractual part-
ners to adjust terms as necessary.  While not the same problem raised by boilerplate contracts,
the resulting alienation between contracting parties, the inability to renegotiate provisions, and
the presumption of assent despite ignorance of the terms, are similarly shared. As noted by
Judge Hand, to make consent serve the economic thinking of the time, “judges had gone to
great lengths to discover in contracts an initial acceptance of consequences they felt bound to
impose on the promisor. It assuaged harsh results, if one could say that the sufferer had agreed
to them in advance, and sophistry, as ever, was a facile handmaiden to authority.”  Learned
Hand, Foreword to Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography, viii (1940), http://
www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/biographies/samuel-williston/.
5. MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW (Princeton University Press, 2013).
6. There certainly has been plenty of finger-pointing. In concluding that the crisis was
avoidable, the Financial Inquiry Commission Final Report noted “The captains of finance and
the public stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to question, under-
stand, and manage evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American
public. Theirs was a big miss, not a stumble.”  The Report also concluded, inter alia, that there
were “widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision. . . .  The sentries were not at
their post.” See FINAL REPORT at xviii.
7. See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 7,
2013 (noting that “GDP is still below its pre-crisis peak in many rich countries. . . .  The
effects of the crash are still rippling through the world economy . . .”); see also Aleatra P.
Williams, Beneath the Stains of Time: The Banality of Race, the Housing and Foreclosure
Crisis, and the Financial Genocide of Minorities, 24 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 247 (2015) (arguing
that despite suggestions that the U.S. has emerged from the crisis, the effects on minorities
remain persistent and may worsen); Sarah Ludwig, Credit Scores in America Perpetuate Ra-
cial Injustice. Here’s How, THE GUARDIAN, (October 13, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/13/your-credit-score-is-racist-heres-why (“Starting
in the 1990’s, financial institutions began flooding historically-redlined neighborhoods of
color.  . . .  Although Wall Street is no longer pumping toxic mortgages into black and Latino
neighborhoods, people and neighborhoods of color continue to reel from the foreclosure crisis,
which many predict is far from over.”).  A worrisome contributor to the crisis in the U.S. is the
unbelievably large ratio of debt to disposable personal income for U.S. households. It rose
from 77% in 1990 to 127% at the end of 2007, much of this increase mortgage-related. The
debt burden of U.S. society has fast become one of the leading causes of structural and persis-
tent inequality. See generally Williams, id.
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endemic in private economic relations.  The overarching claim—that boiler-
plate terms have systematically eroded fundamental aspects of the rule of
law8—reflects Professor Radin’s well-known capacity to take complex chal-
lenges and define them pointedly in terms that expose the real stakes and
values at issue.
In virtually every sphere, the institution of fine print governs both the
big and small aspects of the daily lives of consumers.  In its analysis of the
legal rules that facilitate boilerplate terms, the book provides a stark picture
of the culture from which the subprime mortgage crisis emerged. To be
clear, Boilerplate is not about the sub-prime crises, but its subject matter
illuminates why we remain vulnerable to the debilitating manipulation of
consumers that has become part of the fabric of the digital economy. Boiler-
plate addresses the assault on contract law wrought by boilerplate terms -
terms that are usually unilaterally introduced by a powerful party in a posi-
tion to leverage that power to achieve a set of preferred ends on a “take it or
leave it” basis. I have chosen to use Boilerplate as a centerpiece in my trib-
ute to Professor Radin because it reveals much about the values that define
who she is. Boilerplate reflects the distinctive rigor of her analytical ap-
proach to big problems and her commitment to identify meaningful and fea-
sible solutions to whatever concerns she addresses.  But it is her trenchant
defense of the rule of law and her career-long focus on clarifying, strength-
ening and defending the values that underlie legal rules that stand out force-
fully to me as a vital aspect of her legacy.
I. WE ARE ALL MRS. WILLIAMS
Contract law is defined as private law that governs relations between
legal persons—be they firms or individuals.  Many contracts have boiler-
plate terms.  In most cases, citizens have become acculturated to their exis-
tence, pervasiveness and incomprehensibility.  But if the legal weight
attached to a contract is firmly anchored in the idea that its provisions are
self-imposed through the exercise of a person’s free choice,9 then standard-
8. As this Tribute was going to press, the New York Times ran a three-part series on
fine print in consumer contracts and loss of access to courts. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg and
Robert Gebeloff, Beware the Fineprint – Part I: Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015, at 1 (describing boilerplate arbitration terms as “disabling”
of consumer challenges to practices such as predatory lending, wage theft and discrimination);
Michael Corkery and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Beware the Fine Print – Part II: A Privatiza-
tion of the Justice System, Nov. 1, 2015, N.Y. TIMES, at 1; Michael Corkery and Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, Beware the Fine Print – Part III: In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of
Law, Nov. 2, 2015, N.Y. TIMES, at 1.
9. Debates about the soul of contract law, whether contract is a promise which the law
neutrally enforces versus contract as an imposition of societal goals and standards remain a
vibrant part of contracts theory. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:  A
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) (a leading proponent of contract as promise);
PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
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ized contracts that consist principally of non-dickered terms raise difficult
moral and conceptual questions regarding what we consider an “agreement.”
This is a major thrust of Boilerplate.  Professor Radin makes the unequivo-
cal claim that boilerplate terms should not be so easily or casually enforced
because they violate the moral premise of contract law.  Rather than reflect
movement away from status as the basis of economic organization, boiler-
plate contracts once again instantiate status-based relations in the name of
liberal autonomy.10  She argues that the conditions of the digital age—like
those of the industrial age—urge concern about the extent to which some-
thing we call a contract is, in fact, a true representative of the promises,
covenants or intentions of the parties.  As contracts scholars and teachers
know well, courts engage in interpretative maneuvers and adjust explicit
terms in order to accommodate issues neither party thought about. They fill
in gaps in the contract, effectuate what appears to be the will of the parties,
or adjust theories to meet the demands of justice.11  Courts, of course, rarely
indicate that these moves—masked as they are in various doctrines such as
“implied promises” or rules of interpretation—are tools to address those in-
stances where markets are unlikely to self-correct, and our moral intuition
refuses to be calmed by simply saying “you are bound by the law of contract
because you promised.”12 Boilerplate demonstrates the gross insufficiency
of the rules that justify boilerplate terms on moral, legal and utilitarian
grounds.
Consider the famous case of Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture.13
One of the plaintiffs, a single mother of seven on welfare,14 purchased an
expensive stereo set pursuant to an “add-on” scheme.  Under this scheme,
each item purchased became security for all the items, which meant her fail-
ure to make payments on one item resulted in the loss of all the goods she
had previously purchased. The facts indicate that Mrs. Williams had limited
10. See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34
(1917).
11. See Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Rela-
tions, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 204-06 (1917).
12. As Corbin noted, decisions about the legal relations to be imposed on parties due to
some manifestation of assent “depend upon the notions of the court as to policy, welfare,
justice, right and wrong, such notions often being inarticulate and subconscious.” Id. at 206.
Even proponents of ‘contracts as promise’ would not necessarily argue against a morally just
outcome such as ensuring consumers are not taken advantage of; only that adjusting contracts
to achieve such ends unfairly places the burden of redistribution on individual persons rather
than making it a collective responsibility. See FRIED, supra note 10, at Chapter 3.  There is
also the argument that such pervasive behavior using contract theory really belong in the realm
of tort law. Moreover, promises procured by fraud or duress lack the moral force that mandates
the laws deference and, as such, should not be enforced.
13. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
14. One of the interesting features of the case is the courts abstemious engagement with
the plaintiff’s racial or economic background. The dissent does mention that Mrs. Williams
was receiving “relief funds.” Id. at 450.
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education and the other plaintiffs in the case had only a third-grade educa-
tion.15  According to Mrs. Williams, the goods she purchased were the result
of door-to-door sales by the company, so most of the contracts were signed
in her home; the contracts were signed in blank; she did not receive copies
of the contracts she signed.16 The lower court ruled that the contract should
be enforced,17 but the Appellate Court remanded for application of the test of
unconscionability.18
The facts in Williams always horrify my students who encounter the
“duty to read” rule within the first week of law school.  In their early intro-
duction to the rule, students’ initial reaction is that the rule is responsible,
defensible and central to the notion of consent.  In an ideal world, this may
be an appropriate view.  But of course, the duty to read rule goes much
deeper. Through a fiction of sorts, the rule assumes something elemental—
that a person has the capacity to understand what she is agreeing to and,
implicitly, that a person has the bargaining power to negotiate for terms that
protect her interests.19  These are large assumptions in a society that is
deeply stained by structural inequities—not just the inequities that arise be-
cause of the concentrated economic power of the firm and our related defer-
ence to markets, but also, those inequities that stem from the failure of the
state to evaluate, establish and enforce the basic interests of its citizens. The
Williams case always marks a sharp turn in my contracts class. Students
become more critically aware of the veil that formalism imposes on socio-
economic conditions, and that contract law may exacerbate those challenges
in systemic ways. As they reconsider the utility of the duty to read rules in
light of Williams, I observe their consternation about the ideal of assent and
the unspoken tradeoffs that the classic construction of assent often requires.
Those tradeoffs go well beyond issues of “right” or “fairness.”
Professor Radin argues that such “assent” costs us much more than the
goods or services being bargained for. It costs us our best democratic values.
It numbs us to the long-term danger of losing access to courts and giving up
rights that are fundamental to ensuring that power does not hold a trump
card in socio-economic relations.
What difference should it have made if Mrs. Williams had understood
the terms?  Does assent to something wrong or unfair make it “right” or
15. Transcript of Record at 44–45, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389); Transcript of Record at 37, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3412) (Settled Statement of Proceedings and Evidence).
16. See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the
Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1395-1396 (2014).
17. 350 F. 2d at 447.
18. Id. at 450.
19. See FRIED, supra note 10, at 2 (“[T]he law of contracts facilitates our disposing
of . . . rights on terms that seem best to us.  The regime of contract law, which respects the
disposition individuals make of their rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise
that individuals have rights.”).
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“fair”? Does assent make add-on clauses more appropriate or legally defen-
sible?  Even if we agree that Mrs. Williams did not “need” an expensive
stereo, did she need the sheets, toys, beds, furniture, washing machine, chil-
dren’s items, etc. that preceded the stereo purchase?  Did the store “need” to
keep partial ownership of everything she ever purchased from the store in
order to make a profit on the stereo?
Boilerplate terms pervasively make us all equal in our powerlessness to
effectuate change in the terms that define the circumstances under which we
may use and enjoy goods or services. As Professor Radin observes in Boiler-
plate, even the most sophisticated consumers have difficulty comprehending
the many words, paragraphs and pages that constitute boilerplate contracts.
Who really understands the terms of their Facebook “agreement,” car rental
“agreement,” airline ticket “contract,” or software installation “click-wrap”?
More critically, what would such understanding change? Consumers may
ask for changes that more closely align with reasonable expectations about
rights and avenues for redress, but what’s the recourse if the answer is no?
Perversely, failed attempts to negotiate boilerplates may actually count
against a consumer who later executes an agreement and then argues that the
terms are invalid for lack of assent. The reality is that consumers have no
meaningful options to the pernicious click-wraps, shrink-wraps or other
“wraps” deployed to regulate our relationship to the goods or services that
enable meaningful cultural, political and economic participation in society.
A court (and most contracts students) may be less sympathetic to an eminent
legal scholar who executed a document filled with standardized terms. But
surely clicking “yes” to boilerplate terms, no matter who does so, can’t be
defended as some form of assent.
That is a critical message in Boilerplate.
II. WE, THE PEOPLE
In Professor Radin’s analysis, boilerplate agreements are not just the
instantiation of standardized contracts, which have long been a pervasive
feature of market transactions. Boilerplate agreements are also a species of
non-contract (or a type of non-consent)—a law of coercion justified by the
form of agreement, but lacking any intrinsic moral power or legitimacy.20
These terms are not an imposition of another’s will and preferences; boiler-
plate agreements are not wrong merely because they are contrary to the lib-
eral conception of autonomous individuals. Rather, it is the profound
disruption of the settled role of the state and its institutions of justice and
liberty that is deeply troubling about the casual acceptance of the legality of
boilerplate agreements.  Even if we reasonably conclude that Facebook has a
right to say “no” to suggestions by its consumers, it is a disservice to equate
boilerplate terms with assent in contract formation—a disservice to the peo-
20. This is a paraphrase of a verse of scripture. See 2 Timothy 3:5.
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ple bound by contracts, to the judges who are called on to enforce boilerplate
terms, and to society as a whole.
Professor Radin powerfully argues that boilerplate agreements create a
new reality—an “alternative legal universe” far removed from the classical
world of mutual assent and from the processes that offer an opportunity for
redress familiar to most consumers.21 In short, contemporary boilerplate
agreements not only regulate relations over the specific object a consumer
wants, these instruments leverage that want—they leverage our “needs,”
whether real or imagined—to alter the processes, institutions and options
that serve the critical role of preserving the normative foundations of con-
tractual assent.  For example, boilerplate agreements may eviscerate the
right to a jury trial, eliminate responsibility for fault and deny us the right to
claim certain defenses. They ignore the possibility for individualistic condi-
tions that may demand different (better or worse) bargains.
Placing one’s signature to boilerplate terms is not equivalent to agree-
ment—it is submission to a social order that enjoys the privilege of defer-
ence by legislatures because of our preoccupation with, and faith in,
markets.  After all, in some instances a piece of paper signed by two parties
is not a contract when it violates public policy.22  We have no exact defini-
tion of “public policy” except that, in the world of contracts, it serves as a
heuristic for those outcomes (or processes) we think are destabilizing to es-
tablished order, or that violate a well-recognized moral standard.  In such
cases, we say there is no enforceable contract.23 Assent in such cases is in-
sufficient to overcome the fact that the transaction arguably is inconsistent
with the tenets of a just society. Not all boilerplate terms have this character;
but those that do, especially those that deny access to the institutions de-
signed to defend the rule of law, make a mockery of the notion of contrac-
tual assent largely because they also make a mockery of liberty.  Not only
should such terms be stricken from a contract, Professor Radin argues that
the high social cost imposed by boilerplate terms should occasion liability
for those who use them.
Professor Radin’s proposed imposition of liability isn’t as unreasonable
as some might imagine at first blush. Consider that there is nothing boiler-
plate agreements cannot do and very little contracts law offers to address the
tax they impose on our legal and political values. In addition to imposing
liability, Boilerplate advances a framework designed to improve the tradi-
tional public policy/unconscionability/good faith levers in contract law.
These levers are largely dissatisfying doctrinally and they are applied too
21. See RADIN, supra note 6, Chapter 1.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981).
23. Examples include contracts involving illegal behavior such as a contract for the
purchase of illegal drugs or a contract to kill another person. Other examples are covenants not
to compete that violate the reasonableness standard. See Restatement (2nd) § 188. See gener-
ally, Harlan M. Blake, Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960).
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inconsistently to be effective in addressing the ill-effects of boilerplate
agreements.24  I am favorably inclined to Professor Radin’s framework be-
cause it asks judges to evaluate the nature of the rights taken away in the
boilerplate terms, the quality of the consent, and the prevalence of the
scheme at issue. This approach recognizes the liberty strand that the formal-
istic “assent” box largely eliminated; it reintroduces the notion of par-
ticipatory citizenship and accountability in shaping societal norms.
Ultimately, Professor Radin’s framework requires political institutions
to do more.  It requires protecting the ability of individuals to influence the
terms of contractual relationships that erode our fundamental values and di-
minish our role as citizens entitled to certain basic rights and processes.  To
expect people to be responsible for what they “agree” to, we must also em-
power them with a certain quality of freedom so highly prized by our theo-
ries of political governance. At the same time, we must strengthen the role of
public institutions and courts to intervene when that freedom is reduced to
mere formalism. In short, Professor Radin’s framework treats consumers
like real people whose quality of life matters.
III. WE ARE THE WORLD
The subprime mortgage crisis and its aftermath are not just an American
problem.  The entire global economy was affected by the collective failures
of the state, market, consumers and policy institutions.25  What U.S. courts
and institutions allow is not just watched worldwide, but also mimicked.
This is a function of economic hegemony26 and also because we have de-
manded (and historically earned) the trust and reliance of our trading part-
ners.  The vigilance required to secure this trust and maintain it for global
citizens is perhaps greater than ever before, given the specter of rapid conta-
gion facilitated by a highly networked digital environment.  In this inevitable
global economy, there must be a renewed sense of being our “brother’s
keeper.”  Empowering citizens and consumers to read, resist, and demand
reform of imposed “contractual relations” is essential for preserving the core
liberty necessary to the institution of contracts.  Such empowerment is also
indispensable for strong institutions and resilient, efficient markets.27
24. See RADIN, supra note 6, Chapter 9.
25. See Almunia et. al, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that “world trade fell even faster in the
first year of this crisis than in the [peak year of the Great Depression].”).
26. See G. Cordero Moss, Harmonized Contract Clauses in Different Business Cultures,
in PRIVATE LAW AND THE MAIN CULTURES OF EUROPE 221-22 (T. Wihelmsson, E. Paunio, A.
Pohjolainen eds., 2007, Kluwer International) (noting the leading role of Anglo-American law
in the development of business leading to the rise of terminology and legal concepts from
common law systems in international contracts).
27. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).
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Boilerplate presents a carefully sustained analysis about why certain
kinds of terms should categorically fall beyond the reach of the strong arm of
boilerplate agreements.  In the world of boilerplate terms, standardization is,
arguably, about a different kind of moral order—one punctuated by effi-
ciency and the creation of incentives to encourage opportunities for people,
who otherwise lack good credit or have fallen upon hard times, to purchase
and enjoy the items that make for their conception of the good life.28  Most
people will agree that boilerplate terms can be useful, and used for good.
But as Professor Radin notes, it is not just the substance of boilerplate agree-
ments about which we should be concerned—it is the fact that they elimi-
nate the opportunities for discourse and critical engagement regarding the
repeated transactions we engage in daily.  Certainly in the U.S. more so than
elsewhere, standardized contracts have become the essential tool of social
organization—very few economic transactions are immune from the reach
of standardized terms.
IV. RADIN ON CONTRACTS
Professor Radin’s thesis is much deeper than arguing over whether boil-
erplate terms can be improved.  As noted earlier, she makes important pro-
posals for how we might address the key challenges they pose to our values.
Her critique and her proposals are not premised on any supposition of neu-
trality in the choice of whether to use boilerplate provisions.  There is an
undeniable allure to treating similar transactions similarly.  For this reason,
boilerplate terms are also on the rise internationally.29  Boilerplate terms are
resilient because they offer some predictability and consistency; they impose
an order that society does benefit from and we could all benefit in some
ways as a result. But only if—and the caveat is a strong one—the particular
boilerplate terms are not directed at eroding rights that are fundamental to
democratic society, that might undermine the functioning of democratic in-
stitutions, or that contravene the fundamental purpose of a specific legal re-
gime.  Examples of such rights that should not be subject to boilerplate
agreements might include: the right to assert violations of constitutional
rights in court (rather than arbitration); the right to criticize a product, such
as by exercising copyright’s fair use doctrine; the right to engage in competi-
tion by reverse engineering; the right to alienate one’s property by re-sale;
and the right to raise certain defenses, such as lack of mental capacity, coer-
cion or duress.
Professor Radin is uncompromising in Boilerplate. Even innocent boil-
erplate terms should be cautiously embraced, she argues.  I find compelling
28. See Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Richard
A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
29. See Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable
Law (Giudita Cordero Moss, ed. Cambridge University Press 2011).
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her claim that a boilerplate society is fundamentally anti-democratic (not just
undemocratic).  Not only are consumers unable to comprehend the terms of
many such documents, this state of incomprehensibility actually grows.  As
society becomes more complex and social relations more intricate, boiler-
plate terms only increase in scope and obscurity.  In fact, it seems the more
necessary a service or a good for human welfare, the more likely it is that a
boilerplate term will govern the relations between the provider of the service
or good and those who need it.  From brick and mortar industries to digital
platform services, there is a pervasive reliance on these ubiquitous
instruments.
By calling them “contracts,” boilerplate terms rest in a position of nor-
mative virtue to which they are not entitled.  Boilerplate terms may have
some redeeming features, but Professor Radin exposes just how few there
really are, and how their threat to the very values that make democratic
societies robust, accountable and resilient is much greater.  An uninformed
citizenry cannot resist, challenge or transform what it does not know.  More
critically, when consumers are actively disempowered by the rationalization
that boilerplate terms are inevitable and economically justifiable, democratic
discourse about the structural conditions of life for citizens in a digital econ-
omy is dangerously weakened.  Moreover, the use and defense of boilerplate
terms by institutions whose economic activities impose upon the social wel-
fare seems to affirm our political focus on competition as the sole arbiter of
our nation’s well-being.  However it is construed, “consent” to signing away
our precious rights of citizenship cannot justify such a fundamental decon-
struction of some of our most important institutions, especially courts.  Nor
can boilerplate agreements replace the human experience of participating in
the development of the values that facilitate the exercise of our liberty.  Pro-
fessor Radin points to the various ways (especially ignorance) in which non-
consent occurs—a boilerplate culture entrenches ignorance, dulls our sense
of right and wrong, and eradicates the important, if unstable, line between
the obligation of the state and the privileges of market actors.  Normative
degradation (the systematic undermining and eroding of our core democratic
values or institutions) and democratic degradation (the marginalization of
state responsibility in safeguarding our core democratic values or institu-
tions) are the real and substantial costs of uncritically embracing a boiler-
plate society. Boilerplate does not let us do so ignorantly.
CONCLUSION
Professor Radin’s indomitable perspicacity throughout her formal career
produced distinctive contributions in at least three fields that concern me:
contracts, intellectual property and international law.30  Our judgments, as-
30. I don’t believe for one minute Peggy is in retirement.  I consider this “emerita”
period merely the informal phase of her academic career.
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sumptions and responses to dominant theories of sovereignty in each of
these fields—assent, authorship and the authority of the state—are most crit-
ical to the welfare of human society today.  In Professor Radin’s exemplary
career, she has hewn down trees of intellectual theories that, despite their
own utility, threatened to obscure the light of the principles and values that
sustain the best expressions of human welfare—security of life and liberty.
She can never be accused, like the “captains of finance” or “the public stew-
ards of our financial system,” of failing to question, criticize or urge change
in the subjects of her mastery—subjects that are “essential to the well-being
of the American public.”  Like many other scholars, I have learned much
from the way she has explored philosophical issues by connecting abstract
points to specific doctrines, and she has given us great examples to shore our
appreciation of these points.  We owe her a debt of gratitude for her years of
unequivocal thinking, writing and teaching about what is wrong—and what
could be better—about the laws around which our transactions are structured
and to which our lives and well-being are inescapably tethered.
